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Introduction
It is no exaggeration to state that the story of thalidomide is the story of the modern FDA. Thalidomide
became history's most infamous drug in the late 1950s and early 1960s when it caused serious birth defects
in thousands of newborns. Congress, reacting to the tragedy, quickly passed amendments to the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act which dramatically toughened the FDA's approach to new drugs. But the pendulum has
recently begun to swing the other way: aggravation with the FDA's time-consuming and expensive approval
process for drugs like thalidomide has led to expedited approval procedures and calls for reform.
This paper is intended to document the over thirty-year relationship between the FDA and thalidomide and
to describe in some detail the new uses for that drug. The paper's secondary goal is to demonstrate the
power and versatility of food and drug law online research; every source cited herein, with the exception of
the course materials, is available to anyone with access to Westlaw and the World Wide Web.1
1In order to illustrate this dimension of the paper, I will provide online \addresses" as part of the citation form even where
1The Original Uses Of Thalidomide
Thalidomide, one of the most notorious drugs in the world, was rst developed and sold in Europe in the
1950s as a tranquilizer.2 A West German company3 brought it to market, and it was eventually sold by
fourteen companies in forty-six countries. Doctors in those countries prescribed it to pregnant women as a
relief for morning sickness, not knowing of the drug's horrible eect on their ospring.4 By 1961 or 1962,
thalidomide's teratogenic5 eect on gestating children was widely recognized:6 mothers taking the drug
gave birth to children with severe deformities,7 including blindness, deafness, missing limbs, and ipper-like
appendages.8 The exact number of victims is unknown; one newspaper reported the total as 8,000 in 1985,9
12,000 in 1991,10 and 8,000 again in 1993.11 The exact number is not important, though; the horror and
outrage sparked by this disaster is.
Thalidomide was never approved by the FDA for use in the United States, and therein lies one of the FDA's
the Bluebook does not require them.
2Brett Lowell, Growing Interest in Thalidomide, GMHC Treatment Issues (visited Jan. 6, 1997)
<http://www.gmhc.org/aidslib/ti/ti95b.html>.
3The company, Chemie Grunenthal G.M.B.H., held the original U.S. thalidomide patent, Patent No. 2,830,991.
Application of Hartop, 311 F.2d 249, 265 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (dissenting opinion).
4Thalidomide, Scourge of 1950s, May Block AIDS Virus Growth, Chicago Tribune, Jul. 1, 1993, at 6 [hereinafter Scourge],
available in WL chitrib database.
5\Teratogenic" translates roughly as \deformative," or, in the words of a less sensitive era, \monster-producing," S. Rep.
No. 1744 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884, available in 1962 WL 4821 (views of Senators Estes Kefauver, John A.
Carroll, Thomas J. Dodd, Philip A. Hart, and Edward V. Long) [hereinafter Senate Report].
6Hartop, 311 F.2d at 265 n.5 (dissenting opinion) (\It appears to be a matter of general knowledge [in 1962] that thalidomide,
although eective as a sedative in human beings, resulted in deformed ospring born to women who had taken it during
pregnancy.").
7The vast majority of these children were born in Britain, Germany, and Japan. See Scourge, supra note 4, at 6.
8Thalidomide Victim Learns To Cope With Handicaps, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 27, 1985, at 10, available in WL chitrib
database.
9Id.
10Firms Seek To Use Banned Thalidomide, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 11, 1991, at 12 [hereinafter Banned], available in WL
chitrib database.
11See Scourge, supra note 4, at 6.
2greatest success stories. In November of 1960, Dr. Francis Kelsey, the FDA ocial charged with oversee-
ing thalidomide's New Drug Application (NDA), was concerned that thalidomide might cause neuropathy, a
nerve disease, in some users.12 She decided that the thalidomide NDA was incomplete and refused to approve
it.13 This kept thalidomide tied up just long enough, since in 1961 the drug's eect on newborn children
became known.14 In 1962, President Kennedy presented Dr. Kelsey with a gold medal | the Distinguished
Federal Civil Service Award | for her eorts.15
This resounding success established the FDA's fundamental orientation on issues involving new drugs: better
extremely safe than sorry. Preventing \another thalidomide" became the FDA's number one priority; as the
current FDA Commissioner, Dr. David Kessler, put it, \Back in the 1960s and 1970s, post-thalidomide, the
agency's mission was to keep unsafe products o the market."16 Perhaps due to the visibility of inappropriate
drug approvals, as opposed to the traditional invisibility of inappropriate failures to approve new drugs,17
some of the \protect the public at all costs" attitude has carried though to the present day, with defenders
of the status quo \constantly" reminding potential reformers of the thalidomide tragedy.18
12See Senate Report, supra note 5.
13Id.
14Id. There is, however, a dispute as to whether Dr. Kelsey suspected thalidomide's teratogenic ef-
fects. See Steven B. Harris, The Right Lesson To Learn From Thalidomide (1992) (visited Jan. 6, 1997)
<http://w3.aces.uiuc.edu/DLM/Liberty/Tales/Thalidomide.Html>.
15Peter van der Linden, The Medal From The President (Nov. 11, 1994) (visited Jan. 7, 1997)
<http://www.best.com/debunk/medical/dr kelsey thalidomide.html> (citing The Insight Team, The Sunday Times of
London, The Story of Thalidomide (1979)). Dr. Kelsey still works at the FDA, where she is currently the Director of the
Division of Scientic Investigations. Disease Associations: Thalidomide To Be Used For AIDS Related Disorders Treatment,
AIDS Weekly Plus, Nov. 25, 1996 [hereinafter Associations], available in 1996 WL 11522693.
16AIDS Activism Improves Medicine, The Washington Post, Oct. 16, 1992, at 3 [hereinafter Activism], available in
<http://the-tech.mit.edu/V112/N49/aids.49w.html>.
17See Mary J. Ruwart, Death By Regulation (visited Jan. 7, 1997) <http://www.creative.net/star/fda.htm> (\Former FDA
Commissioner Alexander Schmidt noted that `... rarely, if ever, has Congress held a hearing to look into the failure of FDA to
approve a new entity; but it has held hundreds of hearings alleging that the FDA has done something wrong by approving a
drug...."'); see also Harris, supra note 14 (\Even if the local doctor understands the FDA's role in preventing the patient from
being properly treated, `Stenosis of the Government' is not a medical diagnosis, and cannot be written on a death certicate.").
18142 Cong. Rec. S9550-02 (1996) (citing Barbara Mikulski and Nancy Kassebaum, The FDA Can Work Better, The Wash-
ington Post, Jul. 26, 1996 [hereinafter Work Better]), available in 1996 WL 438360.
3Public outrage provided strong support for the FDA's new approach from the beginning. Books were written
on the topic,19 and the word \thalidomide" entered our lexicon as a harsh pejorative.20 The drug even made
a pop culture appearance in Billy Joel's 1989 hit \We Didn't Start the Fire."21 Recent studies of new uses
for thalidomide have suered accordingly, due largely to \disbelief on the part of many people | including
physicians | that in light of its catastrophic history, thalidomide would ever be oered to anyone for any
purpose."22
Thalidomide And The 1962 Amendments
The change in the FDA's attitude towards new drugs was not the only result of the thalidomide tragedy.
Just as the elixir sulfanilamide poisonings of the 1930s prompted Congress to pass the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act [hereinafter the Act] in 1938,23 the horrors of the thalidomide babies pushed Congress to
enact the so-called \Kefauver Amendments"24 to the Act in 1962.25
Senator Kefauver's motives were noble: he intended the 1962 Amendments to \strengthen and broaden
existing laws in the drug eld so as to bring about better, safer medicine and to establish a more eective
system of enforcement of the drug laws."26 His bill was a complex piece of legislation, but its most important
19See Linden, supra note 15.
20See, e.g., Tim Richard, Thalidomide Comes To The School House (visited Jan. 7, 1997)
<http://oeonline.com/emoryd/timr/tim9.html> (\You would think that our lawmakers would hesitate before exposing
students' minds to potential educational thalidomide.").
21Billy Joel, We Didn't Start The Fire (Columbia 1989) (\[1958:] Lebanon, Charles de Gaulle, California baseball / Stark-
weather homicide, Children of thalidomide..."), available in <http://www.imsa.edu/kubiak/lyrics/Start.Fire.html>.
22William Strain, Thalidomide May Be Useful Against HIV, AIDS Project (Apr., 1996) (visited Jan. 7, 1997)
<http://www.apla.org/apla/9604/twatch.html>.
23Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codied as amended at 21 U.S.C. xx 301 - 395 (1994)).
24The 1962 Drug Amendments, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
25The Evolution of U.S. Drug Law, FDA (visited Jan. 6, 1997) <http://fda.gov//fdac/special/newdrug/benlaw.html> [here-
inafter Evolution].
26See Senate Report, supra note 5.
4provision | the one which would do the most to bring about \better, safer medicine" | was section nine,
which authorized the FDA to deny an NDA if there was not \substantial evidence" the drug would have its
claimed eect.27 The original Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act had only required that new drugs be safe,28 but
Senator Kefauver argued that \the marketing of a safe but ineective drug may well be positively injurious
to the public health" since \[w]hen an ineective drug is prescribed, it is usually in the place of an older but
eective drug."29
As several commentators have noted, there is some irony in the fact that the thalidomide tragedy prompted
Congress to require a showing of ecacy and not just safety before FDA could approve a new drug. Thalido-
mide itself was an eective drug; that is, its tranquilizing qualities were never questioned, and it was even
favored over other sedatives since it didn't produce the usual \hangover eects."30 The problem with thalido-
mide, of course, was it was unsafe for use by pregnant women, an issue which the original FD&C Act, in
theory, adequately addressed.31 In fact, the introduction of the Kefauver Amendments in Congress predated
public knowledge of thalidomide's dangerousness.32
One provision of the 1962 Amendments did directly address part of the existing law which could have | but
turned out not to have | been a problem in the FDA's consideration of thalidomide. The statute previously
dictated that an NDA would automatically be approved in sixty days unless it was specically disapproved
27Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. x 505(d) (explaining \Grounds for refusing application").
28See Senate Report, supra note 5.
29See Senate Report, supra note 5.
30Id.
31Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Origins Of The Generic Drug Scandal And Proposed Amendments To The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
45 Food, Drug, and Cosm. L.J. 385, 389 (1990), available in WL jlr database.
32See Harris, supra note 14.
5or unless its eective date were postponed up to a maximum of 180 days.33 Congress, citing the need \to
give the physicians of the FDA adequate time to appraise the safety and eectiveness of drugs,"34 in section
6 of the bill extended the rst deadline to ninety days and abolished the second.35 Current law provides
that the Secretary of Health and Human Services has 180 days from the ling of an NDA application to
approve the application, convince the applicant to voluntarily delay it, or give the applicant an opportunity
for a hearing within the next four months, after which the Secretary's decision is due within three months.36
In practice, this provision gave the FDA tremendous leverage over drug manufacturers. A company which
refused to cooperate and voluntarily delay its NDA might nd that NDA denied, perhaps on the grounds
that the company developed insucient information to justify approval, or its other drugs delayed in the
approval process. In the drug approval process, time really is money, and a small company whose \burn
rate" is hovering around one-half million dollars per month cannot aord to make an enemy of its regulator.
Dissatisfaction With The FDA: The New Procedures
Despite the public support behind the 1962 Amendments, criticism soon began to tear at the edice of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The critics attacked on three fronts. First, as best articulated by Professor
Peltzman, the 1962 Amendments resulted in the so-called \drug lag."37 Professor Peltzman argued that the
Amendments, as of 1973, eectively prevented the development of twenty-ve new chemical compounds per
33See Senate Report, supra note 5.
34Id.
35Id.
3621 U.S.C. x 355(c)(1) (1994).
37Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law 580-582 (1991) (quoting
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Small Business Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (testimony of
Sam Peltzman)).
6year and resulted in a slowing pace of drug development generally.38 Unsurprisingly, mandating that the
FDA give proposed new drugs another layer of review slowed their approval. Second, the ecacy require-
ment of Kefauver's Amendments resulted in increased drug prices. Higher approval hurdles approximately
doubled the research and development costs a company could expect to incur, and the Amendments acted as
a barrier to market entry, weakening competition and allowing prices to rise in the drug industry.39 Third,
the sick objected that whether or not to use a drug is a personal choice, one that ought not be denied them so
long as a drug was safe: \Each person needs to decide for themselves, in consultation with their physician...
which risks they are willing to take."40
These criticisms did not fall on a deaf ear at Congress or at the FDA, and new, expedited and expanded
procedures were employed to remedy the perceived problems. The FDA established a formal classication
system for NDA and Investigational New Drug, or IND, applications which categorized proposals based pri-
marily on their therapeutic potential.41 The guidelines also took other factors into account, such as whether
the proposal concerned an orphan drug (see below).42 Then, in 1987, the FDA established a new category,
Type AA, for potential AIDS therapies; type AA drugs receive the FDA's highest priority in the drug review
process.43
In 1983, Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act44 to provide incentives for manufacturers to develop orphans
- drugs for treating rare diseases.45 The law permits manufacturers advantageous tax deductions and exclu-
sive marketing rights for new orphan drugs.46
38Id.
39Id.
40See Ruwart, supra note 17.
41Dixie Farley, Benet Vs. Risk: How FDA Approves New Drugs, FDA (visited Jan. 22, 1997)
<http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/newdrug/benets.html>.
42Drug Review Priorities, FDA (visited Jan. 22, 1997) <http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/newdrug/benrev.html>.
43Expanded Access And Expedited Approval Of New Therapies Related To HIV/AIDS, FDA (visited Jan. 6, 1997)
<http://www.fda.gov/oashi/aids/expanded.html> [hereinafter HIV/AIDS].
44Orphan Drug Act, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).
45See Evolution, supra note 25.
46Id.
7The FDA has also set up programs under its \compassionate use" framework to allow access to unapproved
drugs on a case-by-case basis for patients whose serious illnesses have not responded to other therapies.47
The FDA will invoke the primary compassionate use mechanism, the Treatment IND, if the requested drug is
reasonably safe, if there are adequate protections of the patient such as informed consent, and if the doctor
administering the drug keeps records as to its eect on the patient.48 The FDA signicantly expanded
and revised the Treatment IND program in 1987.49 A related mechanism, the \parallel track" policy, gives
patients who are unable to participate in clinical studies access to untested drugs.50
The FDA has also instituted expedited review and accelerated approval for new drugs. Expedited review,
begun in 1988, allows the FDA to assist manufacturers in setting up trials and to waive the phase III study.51
Under accelerated approval, begun in 1992, the FDA may allow promising drugs to reach the market before
their complete eectiveness is demonstrated.52
The New Uses Of Thalidomide Under Expanded And Accelerated FDA Procedures
After thalidomide's fall from grace, few people imagined that it would ever be prescribed again. The
surprising truth, however, is that thalidomide has been in nearly constant use since scientists discovered
47Ken Flieger, FDA Finds New Ways To Speed Treatments To Patients, FDA (1995) (vis-
ited Jan. 22, 1997) <http://fda.gov/fdac/special/newdrug/speeding.html>; John S. James,
Thalidomide For Wasting Syndrome: Progress Toward Compromise, AIDS Treatment News (Nov. 3, 1995) (visited Jan.
7, 1997) <http://www.thebody.com/atn/234.html#Thalidomide>.
48Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jul. 30, 1996) (testimony of
Jerold Mande) [hereinafter Mande].
49See Flieger, supra note 47.
50Id.
51See Mande, supra note 48.
52Id.; see also Flieger, supra note 47.
8its teratogenic eects over thirty years ago.53 This began after an Israeli doctor, treating a patient with
Hansen's disease, or leprosy, administered thalidomide in an attempt to sedate his patient.54 The doctor
found that not only did the medication calm the patient, it also helped to ght the disease.55 Leprosy pa-
tients are the primary consumers of thalidomide today,56 and the drug is available through the U.S. Public
Health Service as part of a compassionate use protocol.57 Celgene, one of the corporations investigating new
uses for thalidomide, received Orphan Drug status for its use of thalidomide as a leprosy treatment in 199358
and is expected to submit an NDA for that indication in early 1997.59
Researchers, interested in thalidomide's unexplained success against leprosy, began to investigate the drug.60
They knew that leprosy is the result of a bacterial infection and that some leprosy patients suer from a
skin condition known as erythema nodosum leprosum, or ENL, if the disease interferes with their immune
system.61 Studies indicated that thalidomide, a drug with no antimicrobial eects (i.e. thalidomide couldn't
ght the leprosy bacteria itself) was very eective in treating ENL, so scientists reasoned that thalidomide
acted directly on the immune system.62 Further experiments showed that thalidomide reduced the immune
system's production and release of a certain hormone-like protein | tumor necrosis factor, or TNF | which
53Denny Smith, Thalidomide And HIV: Several Possible Uses (Apr. 21, 1995) (visited Jan. 6, 1997)
<http://library.jri.org/library/news/atn/atn221g.html>.
54Wendy Maritz, Thalidomide - Hope For HIV And TB Suerers, Strategic Health Review (Nov. 28, 1996) (visited Jan. 6,
1997) <http://www.web-ads.co.za.html>.
55Id.
56Carol Blaney, Second Thoughts About Thalidomide, Medical Sciences Bulletin (visited Jan. 6, 1997)
<http://pharminfo.com/cgi-bin/print hit .../thalidomide.html>.
57See Banned, supra note 10.
58Thalidomide Now Approved By FDA For A Fourth Application, Doctor's Guide (Mar. 20, 1996) (visited Jan. 12, 1997)
<http://www.plsgroup.com/dg/6cfe.htm> [hereinafter Fourth].
59FDA Application: Celgene Seeks O.K. To Use Thalidomide In Leprosy Cases, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 26, 1996, at 7 [here-
inafter Application], available in WL chitrib database.
60See Blaney, supra note 56.
61See Lowell, supra note 2.
62Id.
9acts as an intercellular messenger.63 In normal concentrations TNF helps the body ght pathogens, but
certain chronic conditions cause the body to overproduce it, leading to a number of unpleasant eects.64
This was conrmed by one AIDS study in which researchers administered TNF itself to patients and found
it signicantly aggravated their symptoms.65 Thalidomide's ability to inhibit the body's use of TNF, like
other TNF inhibitors, thus generally doesn't attack the disease directly; instead it \attack[s] an underlying
immune abnormality that occurs because of the disease... mak[ing] the disease easier to deal with in a more
direct fashion."66 In short, thalidomide prevents the immune system of a person suering from a chronic
illness like leprosy from actually harming the person.
Understanding the role of TNF in leprosy was not the most signicant nding of the researchers whose work
is described above. Leprosy is, after all, a rare,67 though terrible, disease. Instead, the real insight was the
role thalidomide might play against other chronic diseases in which the body's TNF overproduction causes
serious and long-term harm: \Once the mechanism [of action] in leprosy was established, we looked at other
diseases associated with high levels of TNF."68 This second-stage research has involved a large number of
aictions. Diabetes research indicates that TNF may have an impact on a diabetic's insulin absorption
and use, as well as on glucose uptake, and researchers at Andrulis,69 another company researching new uses
for thalidomide, have conducted a phase II trial of the drug.70 Andrulis researchers are further investi-
gating whether the devastating neurological damage associated with Alzheimer's disease can be mitigated
63Id.
64Mark Bower, Thalidomide, Project Inform (last modied Jan. 20, 1996) <www.projinf.org/fs/thalido.html>.
65See Lowell, supra note 2.
66See Blaney, supra note 56.
67Slightly over 2,000 new leprosy cases were reported in the United States between 1984 and 1993. See Application, supra
note 59.
68Katie Rodgers, Thalidomide's Eect On AIDS And TB Under Scrutiny, Drug Topics, Mar. 7, 1994, at 24, available in
1994 WL 2885995.
69Andrulis' web site is located at <http://www.andrulis.com>.
70Katie Rodgers, Diabetes Care: New Research, New Hope, Drug Topics, Jun. 12, 1995, at 62, available in 1995 WL 8066442.
10by thalidomide.71 The company holds a patent for the use of thalidomide in the treatment of Alzheimers
and other neurological disorders.72 Celgene73 is also investigating thalidomide's potential as a brain cancer
therapy.74 Still other researchers are looking at uses for thalidomide in the treatment of bacterial meningitis,
rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis, tuberculosis, and a variety of other diseases.75
At least judging by the amount of attention it has garnered, however, the most exciting area of thalidomide
research involves HIV and AIDS. While ordinarily characterized as an \immune deciency," a term which
seems to indicate that the body's immune system is incapable of reacting to disease, HIV also causes an
\autoaggressive" reaction, leading to the overproduction of TNF.76 As with other diseases, too much TNF
aggravates the symptoms of AIDS, which include: prurigo nodularis, itchy bumps on the skin;77 diarrhea;78
ulcers;79 and cachexia, a severe weight loss condition also known as \wasting."80 Thalidomide currently is
being tested as a therapy to all of those symptoms.
Most importantly, unlike thalidomide research for other diseases, AIDS-related research has also uncovered
evidence that thalidomide may actually help retard the development of the disease itself. Experiments have
71Thalidomide Studied For Multiple Sclerosis, Drug News & Perspectives, Nov. 28, 1995 [hereinafter MS], available in WL
drugnews database.
72Andrulis Announces Collaboration, Patent Using Thalidomide For Alzheimer's, Drug News & Perspectives, Sep. 5, 1995,
available in WL drugnews database.
73Celgene's web site is located at <http://www.chem.com/celgene/>.
74Thalidomide, EntreMed Clinical Data, R&D Focus Drug News, Dec. 9, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13640914.
75See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 68; MS, supra note 71.
76See Smith, supra note 53.
77Prurigo Nodularis: Thalidomide (last modied Jan. 26, 1996) <http://galen.library.ucsf.edu/aidstrials/trials/trial10124.html>.
78Edward King, Thalidomide And AIDS (visited Jan. 6, 1997) <http://www.dircon.co.uk/nam/atu/31part1.html>;
Thalidomide Now Available To Treat AIDS Weight Loss, Medical Tribune (Jun. 6, 1996) (visited Jan. 6, 1997)
<http://www.medscape.com/News/jobson/MedTrib/obgyn/1996/v03.n11/Thalidomide.html?>.
79See King, supra note 78; Lowell, supra note 2. Andrulis plans to le an NDA for this indication in early 1997. See
Associations, supra note 15.
80See Lowell, supra note 2; Thalidomide Submitted for NDAs For Use In Leprosy And AIDS Cachexia, Doctor's Guide (Nov.
11, 1996) (visited Jan. 12, 1997) <http://www.pslgroup.com/dg/daa6.htm>.
11shown that TNF can both activate latent HIV viruses81 and enhance HIV replication.82 It is thus possible
that a TNF inhibitor such as thalidomide may actually reduce a patient's \viral burden."83
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the constant pressure applied by AIDS activists to the FDA,84 AIDS-related
indications of thalidomide have been the beneciary of the full range of expedited and expanded FDA
procedures. Celgene has received Orphan Drug status for thalidomide's use against both cachexia and
mouth ulcers,85 and Andrulis won an Orphan Drug designation for thalidomide's use against a dierent
type of mouth sore.86 Treatment INDs and parallel tracking are available to suerers of both ulcers and
cachexia.87 The FDA also has invoked its expedited review by assisting the corporations in designing and
implementing clinical trials,88 and by allowing phases II and III of the required studies to be combined.89
The devotion of the FDA's time and resources seems to have paid o: Celgene plans to apply for an NDA
for thalidomide's use against cachexia early this year.90
In the rush to test thalidomide as a treatment for all of those diseases and symptoms, the drug's most
obvious lesson | the potential for devastating birth defects | has not been forgotten.91 An FDA advisory
committee held two days of hearings on this subject in November, 1996,92 where experts advised that the
81See Lowell, supra note 2.
82See Smith, supra note 53.
83See Lowell, supra note 2.
84See Activism, supra note 16.
85See Fourth, supra note 58.
86Treatment: Thalidomide Approved As Treatment For AIDS-Associated Ulcers, AIDS Weekly, Jun. 12, 1995 [hereinafter
Ulcers], available in 1995 WL 2242284.
87Ivy Fleischer Kupec, Thalidomide Update, FDA (Feb. 26, 1996) (visited Jan. 6, 1997)
<http://fda.gov//bbs/topics/ANSWERS/ANS00714.html>.
88Id.
89See Ulcers, supra note 86; Cachexia (Treatment): Pivotal Trial Completed For Thalidomide In AIDS Patients, AIDS
Weekly Plus, Oct. 21, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11522467; Rodgers, supra note 68.
90Celgene To Ask FDA Approval For Thalidomide In AIDS Use, Nando (Jul. 9, 1996) (visited Jan. 7, 1997)
<http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/health/070996/health7 9222.html>.
91At least not in this country; Brazil, however, already has another thalidomide generation. See Associations, supra note 15.
92Thalidomide Hearings, Drug Topics, Oct. 21, 1996, at 22, available in 1996 WL 11132593.
12FDA consider mandating two forms of birth controls for every pre-menopausal non-sterile woman involved in
any thalidomide study.93 Some researchers, taking no chances, have completely barred pregnant or nursing
women from participating in their studies.94 This has not set well with some AIDS interest groups, who
argue that \[p]eople facing serious health concerns deserve to make their own informed treatment decisions."95
Given the horror of the previous generation of thalidomide babies, however, they are unlikely to prevail.
Current Events
The interrelationship between thalidomide and the evolution of the FDA did not stop at the FDA's recent
procedural innovations. Arguments still swirl around the controversial drug and the FDA's handling of it
and similar drugs. But the attacks of the FDA's critics are not new; in fact, they are the same criticisms
which led the FDA to implement its new procedures only a few years ago.
The alleged \drug lag" is again at the heart of the debate. Citing the now-familiar proposition that \[p]atients
can be harmed by delay in approving safe and eective new medicines just as they can by the approval of un-
safe new medicines,"96 reformers have accused the FDA of adhering to its thalidomide-centered approach to
drug approval.97 One particularly harsh critic even maintains that the FDA's glacial review of beta-blockers
resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands by cardiac arrhythmia.98 Critics also attack the drug review
process as being too costly, averaging nearly $350M per drug.99 Finally, critics argue that a chronically and
93See Associations, supra note 15.
94See Prurigo Nodularis: Thalidomide, supra note 77.
95See Smith, supra note 53.
96See Work Better, supra note 18.
97141 Cong. Rec. E1273-02 (1996) (quoting James P. Driscoll, The FDA Can Work Better, The Los Angeles Times, Jun.
15, 1996), available in 1996 WL 438360.
98See Harris, supra note 14.
99The Access to Medical Treatment Act: Hearings on S. 1035 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
104th Cong. (1996) (opening statement of Senator Kassebaum, Committee Chair) [hereinafter Kassebaum], available in 1996
13terminally ill person's decision to take a drug should rest between that person and their doctor alone.100
They reason that ecacy is irrelevant for a new drug with the potential of treating patients with diseases
like AIDS, since with the drug suerers might get better, but without the drug they will surely die; so why
not let them make their own treatment decisions?
The FDA takes strong issue with these accusations. Dr. Kessler put it bluntly: \The FDA is a world-wide
leader when it comes to reviewing and approving new drugs rapidly and eciently," so \[i]t is time to put
to rest the incorrect perception that American patients generally suer from a so-called drug lag."101 The
FDA published a report in 1995, entitled \Timely Access to New Drugs in the 1990s: An International
Comparison," which demonstrates that, on average, the FDA approves drugs at least as fast as, if not faster
than, its counterparts in other countries.102 The FDA also points out that AIDS-related pharmaceuticals
are approved particularly quickly: of the eight antiretrovirals approved as of June 1996, the longest took six
months.103 Finally, the FDA notes that 1996 was its best year on record for drug approvals, as one hundred
and thirty-one new drugs were approved, a sixty percent increase over 1995.104 Dr. Kessler, speaking to the
Food and Drug Law Institute, noted that the FDA approved forty-six New Molecular Entities (NMEs105)
in scal year 1996, an approximate one-hundred percent increase over recent years.106 As for why it should
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100141 Cong. Rec. E1424-01 (1995) (statement of Rep. Peter A. Defazio), available in 1996 WL 411624. This senti-
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14still review drugs for eectiveness even when patients suer from fatal diseases, the FDA responds that the
critically ill need to be protected from health care quacks and from substituting ineective treatments for
eective ones.107
The current debate over the drug approval process is complicated somewhat by the presence of the so-called
\buyer's clubs," organizations of activists who break the law to make unapproved drugs available to the
aicted, often those with AIDS.108 These groups, who feel it is \patronizing" for the FDA to tell AIDS-
suerers that they \can't take control of their own therapy,"109 have set up their own compassionate use
programs, participation in which generally requires a doctor's prescription and a patient's informed con-
sent.110 The FDA repeatedly warned the clubs to stop supplying thalidomide,111 but the clubs refused until
a meeting between them, the FDA, and Celgene, in which they agreed to stop supplying the drug when the
FDA made it widely available.112
Whatever advances the FDA's expedited and expanded procedures represent, AIDS patients have continued
to demand access to thalidomide.113 Responding to such pressure, Congress has jumped into the fray with
two pieces of proposed legislation: The Access to Medical Treatment Act [hereinafter the Access Act] and the
Food and Drug Administration Performance and Accountability Act of 1995 [hereinafter the Performance
Act].
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15The Access Act,114 sponsored by Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle and cosponsored by at least sixteen
other senators,115 would allow patients access to an unapproved drug if there is no evidence that it is unsafe,
if the manufacturer is licensed, and if informed consent is obtained.116 Essentially, the Access Act amounts
to a repeal of the ecacy provisions of the 1962 Amendments, at least so far as certain drugs and patients
are concerned. Senator Daschle, testifying before the Senate Labor & Human Resources Committee, said
that \People should have the right to choose from among a full range of medical treatment options | par-
ticularly people who suer from chronic and potentially fatal conditions that do not respond to conventional
treatments."117 Jerold Mande, Commissioner Kessler's Executive Assistant, delivered the FDA's response to
the Committee.118 Mande pointed to the FDA's recent treatment of thalidomide as evidence of the FDA's
\exibility and open mindedness" and explained the various ways in which the FDA is able to speed approval
and access to promising new drugs.119 Mande also repeated the FDA's position on unapproved alternative
therapies: allowing access to unapproved drugs exposes vulnerable patients to unscrupulous snake-oil sales-
men and may encourage such patients to substitute ineective therapies for ecacious ones.120 Senator
Kassebaum, the Committee Chair, stated the dilemma succinctly: \The fundamental question before us to-
day is how to achieve [the] balance between freedom of choice, on the one hand, and a reasonable assurance
of safety and eectiveness, on the other."121
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16The Performance Act, sponsored by Senator Kassebaum, is an attempt to answer that question. Her bill
would \substantially shorten and make more ecient new product development and FDA review times
without compromising either safety or eectiveness."122 The Performance Act would establish agency per-
formance standards, shorten new drug approval timetables, and require the FDA to assist companies by
helping to design test trials and by telling them what standards will be used to evaluate new drugs.123 In
short, Senator Kassebaum wants the best of both words: fast and ecient yet full and complete drug review.
Dr. Kessler, testifying on the bill, said that while he shared her goals, he did not believe that the FDA could
meet the bill's requirements without additional resources.124 Senator Kennedy, speaking on the oor of the
Senate, predicted that the Performance Act would place the FDA in the grips of industry, leading to crises
similar to Britain's mad-cow disease disaster.125
Conclusion
The exact resolution of the debate between FDA review and patient autonomy is, at this stage, unclear.
Regardless, it appears certain that thalidomide's unique status | rst as the impetus for the empowering
of the FDA in 1962, now as a major factor pushing for a stripping away much of that power | will continue
for the foreseeable future.
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